Optimization of Incentive Mechanisms for Grassroots Civil Servants in County L from the Perspective of ERG Theory
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.65196/qp59f025Keywords:
ERG theory; grassroots civil servants; incentive mechanismAbstract
Against the backdrop of comprehensively advancing rural revitalization and deepening reforms in grassroots governance systems, underdeveloped counties in China commonly face challenges such as overlapping administrative tasks, an imbalance between authority and responsibility, insufficient institutional support, and limited career development opportunities among grassroots civil servants. Based on Alderfer’s ERG theory, this study develops an analytical framework consisting of three dimensions: existence needs, relatedness needs, and growth needs. It systematically examines the current status and practical challenges of incentive mechanisms for grassroots civil servants in County L and proposes a systematic, coordinated, and practical optimization pathway. The findings reveal that the current incentive mechanism in County L suffers from insufficient material support, a mismatch between remuneration and workload, and weak occupational security in terms of existence needs. Accordingly, this study constructs a coordinated incentive system characterized by secured existence, harmonious relationships, and sustainable development. The proposed framework aims to provide theoretical insights and practical guidance for stabilizing grassroots civil servant teams, enhancing endogenous motivation for grassroots governance, and promoting the modernization of governance systems and governance capacity.
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